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Introduction 
The Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (FEHBP) is the 
country’s largest employer-
sponsored insurance plan and has 
provided good coverage to 
millions of enrollees for over half a 
century. Each year, enrollees 
choose among many competing 
health plans, and the program has 
kept health plan participation high, 
administrative costs low, and 
premiums affordable for federal 
workers and their families.1 
Politically, the program as a model 
for reform has long held appeal 
across the spectrum.2 
Conservatives like the program’s 
private health plans and its reliance 
on market competition rather than 
public controls to set benefits and 
dampen price increases. Liberals 
like the prospect of expanding to 
everyone the FEHBP’s large-
employer-style benefits, 
community rating, and close 
oversight of insurer pricing. 
Barack Obama spoke approvingly 
of it during his campaign. He and 
others have signaled that reform 
should reflect similar principles,3 
and some form of similar 
purchasing pool or “exchange” is 
part of many current proposals.4 It 
has also been suggested that health 
reform simply open the existing 
FEHBP for broader enrollment.5 
Summary  
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altering. It seems very likely that stronger countermeasures will be needed for a new exchange than the FEHBP has as 
yet deployed. Second, it is challenging to maintain a wide spread of benefit packages for enrollees to choose among. 
Plausibly, better risk adjustment or other anti-selection mechanisms would assist in achieving this goal. Third, the 
FEHBP approach of negotiating with health plans and maintaining reserves that can be used to offset unexpected costs 
in a given year or temper year-to-year premium fluctuations is an alternative to direct public regulation of premiums. 
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This brief suggests that FEHBP 
experience offers important 
insights about how to structure fair 
and effective health plan 
competition, an important 
component of the proposed health 
insurance exchanges. However, 
policy makers should not lose sight 
of the important differences 
between structuring and 
administering an employee 
benefits program and operating an 
insurance purchasing mechanism 
for a diverse set of people 
choosing to enroll from the general 
population. Moreover, it does not 
seem to be wise simply to open the 
existing FEHBP to non-federal 
enrollment nor feasible to precisely 
replicate the FEHBP and its 
national approach outside its 
current context of federal 
employment. Those operating a 
new exchange can still learn from 
FEHBP’s experience, particularly 
about benefits design, selection 
and risk segmentation, and 
relations with participating health 
plans. 
How the Federal 
Program Works 
What are the FEHBP’s key 
features?6 Eligibility extends to 
almost all federal civilian 
employees and retirees, as well as 
to their dependents.7 Enrollment 
occurs at time of hire and 
thereafter during annual open 
enrollment. Coverage is portable 
from federal job to federal job and, 
for national plans, across regions. 
Eligibility continues into 
retirement on the same basis as 
during employment. Participating 
plans include national fee-for-
service plans (PPOs), location-
specific health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), and new 
high-deductible, consumer-
directed options. Nearly 300 plans 
participate nationwide, and dozens 
of plans serve areas with a high 
concentration of federal 
employment, like metropolitan 
Washington, DC. However, 
enrollees in less populous areas 
have far fewer choices, and some 9 
states lack HMOs altogether.8 
Benefit packages and premiums 
vary because they are developed 
by plans themselves, each seeking 
to attract enrollees. However, 
waiting periods and exclusions of 
pre-existing health conditions are 
not allowed. The Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) 
must agree to benefit packages and 
prices each year, but does so 
through negotiation rather than 
mandates.9 
Funding comes from premiums 
shared by enrollees and the federal 
employer. Each plan charges the 
same community-rated premium to 
all enrollees—regardless of age, 
sex, race, health, or work or 
retirement status—but different 
plans charge different rates. Fee- 
for-service plans set nationally 
uniform rates, but HMO premiums 
vary by location. Federal enrollees 
typically pay 25 percent of 
premium for lower priced plans, 
but a greater share for higher 
priced plans.10 Non-federal 
workers in group plans, on 
average, pay a similar premium 
share for family coverage, but less 
for individual coverage.11 
Price-sensitive competition among 
plans is the centerpiece of the 
FEHBP’s structure, as enrollees 
choose among plans based on 
varying benefits and costs. Prices 
across FEHBP plans are driven by 
the mix of enrollees attracted, the 
precise benefits and provider 
networks offered, cost-sharing 
requirements, and other provisions. 
Between premiums and cost 
sharing, enrollee costs can be 
substantial.12 Enrollees must pay 
the full marginal premium 
difference when they chose a 
higher-priced plan.13 Insurers can 
then observe to what extent 
enrollees are willing to pay more, 
for example, to get easier access to 
more participating providers, and 
over time adjust their coverage 
offerings. 
Administration of the program is 
split between the federal agencies 
where employees work and the 
OPM. The agencies, like large 
private employers, operate benefits 
offices to assist their employees’ 
choice among plans; OPM enrolls 
retirees. OPM also contracts with 
participating health plans, oversees 
their premiums, limits 
administrative loadings, generates 
standardized information about 
participating plans, conducts 
annual open enrollment, and pays 
plans with premium contributions 
collected from agencies, 
employees, and retirees. OPM 
retains one percent of premium 
contributions as its administrative 
fee. It also withholds some three 
percent of each plan’s premiums as 
a reserve that can offset a plan's 
losses in a year if actual medical 
claims spending exceeds 
projections, or alternatively may 
be applied to premiums in 
advance, to reduce an otherwise 
unusually large annual increase.14 
Some 8 million people are now 
enrolled in FEHBP. Retirees are 
almost as numerous as workplace 
enrollees—a pattern that is very 
different than for private 
insurance. Over two thirds of 
enrollees select fee-for-service 
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(PPO) plans; about 31 percent 
choose HMOs. Almost half of 
enrollees are in the dominant Blue 
Cross Blue Shield plan, and about 
three quarters enroll in one of the 
five largest plans.15 
Why the FEHBP Looks 
Attractive for Reform 
The FEHBP’s structured 
competition among community-
rated insurers is popular. It is liked 
by politicians and federal 
employees and envied by many 
Americans who have access only 
to small group or non-group 
coverage. Part of what they envy is 
the FEHBP’s lack of medical 
underwriting.16 Federal enrollees 
enjoy not only guaranteed access 
to coverage without waiting 
periods nor pre-existing condition 
exclusions, but also free choice 
among multiple plans during open 
enrollment each year, an 
opportunity often lacking even in 
large private workplaces.17 
Moreover, the FEHBP’s 
combination of competition and 
private choices with public 
oversight make its structure a 
plausible political middle ground 
between those favoring smaller 
and larger roles for government in 
health coverage. 
FEHBP coverage has been kept 
affordable by a combination of 
public administration and price-
conscious enrollee choice among 
competing private health plans. 
The most popular coverage, a PPO 
offered nationwide, costs much the 
same as average coverage among 
large private groups, while many 
FEHBP HMOs cost less.18 During 
the 1980s, annual FEHBP 
increases in premiums were below 
those of private plans, most of 
which in that era had not moved to 
managed care.19 Since 1990, 
FEHBP increases have been 
similar to those in other group 
plans, according to the 
Government Accountability 
Office.20 
The program offers an alternative 
model of insurance regulation. 
FEHBP is exempt from state 
mandated benefits, and allows 
enrollee choice to determine what 
benefit levels prevail. Enrollee 
shopping and moderate program 
oversight have generated good, 
though not exceptional, benefits. 
Federal benefits fall a bit short of 
large private plans in actuarial 
value, and the employee share of 
premiums is often higher.21 Yet the 
FEHBP offers more choice among 
plans, and its benefit levels exceed 
those of most small employer 
groups or individuals buying on 
their own—insurance sectors that 
contain the bulk of people likely to 
be served by new plans under 
health reform. Some have 
promoted FEHBP—or a lookalike 
program—as the best approach.22 
Why It Is Difficult Simply 
to Open up the FEHBP or 
Replicate It for New 
Enrollees 
Suggestions that the current 
FEHBP accept any American not 
satisfied with their current 
coverage imply that other forms of 
insurance and ways of obtaining it 
would remain unchanged.23 This 
approach would threaten 
substantial adverse selection 
against the program, considerable 
disruption for current federal 
enrollees, and substantial premium 
burdens and cost sharing for 
unsubsidized new enrollees. 
Moreover, OPM would face major 
administrative challenges in 
recruiting substantial new plan 
participation in most of the country 
as well as in relating to an 
unpredictable but large number of 
new individuals and employers 
who lack the common interests and 
fiscal ties created by employment. 
An open FEHBP would also raise 
issues of fairness, as new enrollees 
could be better subsidized than 
existing workers.24 This approach 
has been opposed by some current 
federal enrollees and rejected by 
President Obama.25 
For many reasons, an FEHBP-like 
program—through a new 
exchange—would need to be 
designed and operate differently 
than the FEHBP. Design would 
need to change because the 
enrollee population would differ 
sharply from current enrollees, 
being more diverse in age, health 
needs, preferences, and income 
than today’s FEHBP enrollees, 
notably with respect to abilities to 
meet the cost-sharing requirements 
of current plans. Operations would 
need to change to deal with new 
enrollees outside the context of 
large group employment and with 
health plans in direct competition 
with outside plans, including ones 
that might be run by entities with 
plans in the exchange. What 
changes would be appropriate 
depends on the exact scope of the 
new program, including eligibility, 
existence of mandates and other 
factors.26 An FEHBP-like 
approach seems likely to become 
more like a free-standing exchange 
run at the state, regional, or 
national level than like the 
FEHBP, which is limited to federal 
enrollees. 
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Some Lessons of FEHBP 
Experience for New 
Exchanges 
However a new insurance market 
is structured, its design and 
operations should recognize 
FEHBP experience. Several areas 
deserve highlighting: self-selection 
of enrollees into or out of the 
program, selection of enrollees 
across health plans within the 
program, the design of health care 
benefits, and relationships with 
participating health plans. 
Adverse Selection of Enrollees 
into the Exchange 
The FEHBP as constituted has not 
faced a substantial problem of 
selective enrollment into the 
FEHBP by employees or retirees. 
Some 85 percent of employees 
participate, about the same as in 
the private sector.27 A large 
majority of those not enrolling are 
nonetheless insured, likely with 
another employer group that they 
find advantageous.28 FEHBP’s 
reasons for high participation are 
the same as for other large 
employers: Workers are eligible 
because they have been hired, not 
because they want health coverage. 
The employer makes available the 
benefits part of workers’ pay only 
for group-plan enrollees. Federal 
law exempts premiums from tax 
only for employer-group 
enrollment. And enrollees’ choices 
of benefits and of time of 
enrollment are constrained. 
An FEHBP-like exchange, 
however, could alter incentives for 
enrollment among newly eligible 
people. The open enrollment and 
community rating of an exchange 
could incur some level of “adverse 
selection,” or enrollment of above-
average risk people, who face 
higher prices or even rejection 
under traditional insurance practice 
outside of large groups. This 
situation could persist unless 
reform calls for everyone to buy 
insurance through the new 
exchange and requires insurers 
outside the exchange to follow the 
same rules as exchange insurers.29 
Enrolling people disadvantaged by 
current private insurance markets 
is a policy goal of reform, as older, 
sicker people are most in need of 
coverage. However, such 
enrollment raises the premiums of 
the new exchange’s health plans 
that they join, which further 
increases the motivation for 
younger, healthier people to 
choose non-exchange insurance if 
it can offer better rates. Such 
adverse selection was visible 
among enrollees in the 
Massachusetts Connector, 
especially before the state’s 
mandate for individuals to obtain 
coverage was fully implemented 
and enforced.30 
Some countermeasures are likely 
to be needed. The guidance from 
FEHBP experience is mainly to 
have any new exchange adapt 
methods that large employers use 
to boost broad-based participation. 
For example, one countermeasure 
is a mandate to buy insurance, 
which is certainly under policy 
discussion. Another is to provide 
subsidy or tax advantages only to 
coverage within the exchange, akin 
to employers contributing only for 
their own coverage. Another 
approach is greater regulation of 
private insurance, which is also 
under discussion—but somewhat 
incongruent with the competing 
desire to allow people to keep their 
current coverage if they like it. 
Biased Selection among 
Participating Health Plans 
within an Exchange 
Not only could an FEHBP-like 
exchange compete with other 
insurers, but the various 
participating exchange plans 
would also compete with one 
another. Under any multiple-
choice system, one or more plans 
may disproportionately attract 
people who are older or sicker than 
average—for example, by offering 
easier access to specialists or other 
differences in benefits.31 Then such 
a plan must charge above-average 
premiums, which in turn 
encourages people whose 
premiums are now below average 
to leave, thus raising premiums for 
the remaining people, which drives 
away yet more people. Such 
recurring adverse selection can 
create a “death spiral” that makes 
the plan unsustainable, whether or 
not it provides better or more 
efficient care, given the particular 
mix of health risks within its 
enrolled population.32 
Historically, within the FEHBP, 
higher-cost enrollees have tended 
to cluster disproportionately within 
the fee-for-service plans.33 
Moreover, participating health 
plans have been found to differ 
from one another by much more in 
premiums than in the actuarial 
value of the benefits that they 
offer—a result consistent with risk 
segmentation across plans.34 For 
practical observers, the most 
visible evidence from FEHBP has 
been that adverse selection drove 
out the Aetna indemnity plan in 
1990 and the Blues high option 
plan in the early 2000s, both of 
which had been popular among 
older enrollees. 
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A key point to remember is that 
community rating does not keep all 
prices at average levels; it applies 
only within each plan. Cross-plan 
differences are driven heavily by 
the risk profile of enrollees—sixty 
year olds cost about six times as 
much as twenty year olds35—as 
well as by benefit and provider 
payment structures and other 
factors. The introduction of new 
benefits in the form of consumer-
directed, high-deductible plans 
seems to be changing the age 
distribution of enrollees selecting 
different plans.36 
Segmentation has recurred within 
FEHBP even though the program 
lacks many of the features of 
private insurance markets often 
cited as promoting selection.37 
There is completely open 
enrollment, FEHBP forbids 
underwriting by plans, no agents 
stand between applicants and 
insurers who may also effectively 
screen prospective enrollees, and 
the structured market lacks the 
kind of aggressive, for-profit 
insurers active in other insurance 
markets. Only comprehensive 
benefits are allowed, and the 
Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has sought to reduce 
benefit differentials over time. The 
structure of the federal 
contribution also reduces selection 
pressure because low-cost people 
cannot benefit from the full 
premium savings of a low-cost 
plan, nor do high-cost people pay 
the full cost of enrolling in a 
higher-cost plan. 
Selection pressures might be 
greater within a new exchange 
than under the FEHBP, as people 
outside of large employer groups, 
including the uninsured, appear to 
be more diverse in health status 
and income than federal workers 
and their families. Exchanges may 
need additional measures to 
maintain a relatively stable array 
of HMOs and fee-for-service 
plans. Such measures might 
include a high-risk pool, 
reinsurance, or risk-adjusted 
premiums that could help maintain 
the focus of competition as good 
value rather than attracting good 
risks.38 
Achieving Appropriate Benefit 
Levels 
Several points about FEHBP’s 
approach to benefits deserve 
emphasis. First, enrollees greatly 
value having a choice of plans 
even though all must have 
comprehensive benefits in the 
sense of covering the same broad 
range of service categories, from 
inpatient care to pharmaceuticals. 
Provider networks, premium 
shares, cost sharing, and many 
other features vary widely. 
Enrollees appear able to assess 
those choices with the help of 
substantial federal and private 
information about plans. Federal 
unions and others complain that 
FEHBP and its plans have over 
time tightened covered networks of 
providers and increased premium 
shares and cost sharing—but so 
have private employers and their 
plans. 
Second, variation in benefits has 
the downside of fostering risk 
segmentation as well as “moral 
hazard,” increased consumption 
due to such things as enrollees’ 
ability to shift plans when 
expecting certain types of health 
spending in a following year. As a 
class, enrollees in higher priced 
FEHBP plans show their 
willingness to pay for better access 
or other features because they face 
the full marginal premium above 
the capped federal contribution.39 
This approach reduces the 
likelihood of “gold plated” 
benefits. It can be argued that 
benefits should be more 
standardized to promote price 
competition. How much benefits 
variation a new exchange would 
want to foster probably depends 
upon reformers’ preferences 
among competing policy goals, as 
well as what other complementary 
provisions are also politically 
feasible. If there is robust risk 
adjustment for premiums, for 
example, wide variation in benefits 
may seem more appropriate. 
Third, challenges may arise in 
using the FEHBP approach of 
valuing benefits through market-
based choices if a large share of 
exchange enrollees cannot pay 
their own way. Explicitly tiered 
benefits for different income strata, 
as in Massachusetts, is one 
possible resolution. 
Fourth, reformers may need to 
adjust political expectations. Many 
Americans believe that they should 
have the same benefits as their 
Congressmen, and perceive that 
high officials have wonderful 
benefits with easy access to any 
provider. As already noted, 
however, FEHBP plans are not 
more generous than large private 
employer plans. General 
impressions of FEHBP generosity 
are colored by years of news about 
presidential and congressional care 
at military hospitals or the 
Congressional health clinic, but the 
latter are separately funded and not 
part of FEHBP.40 
Another widespread misimpression 
is that the FEHBP offers low-cost 
care because the government is 
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such a large purchaser. FEHBP’s 
size surely enables the program to 
attract participation from many 
health plans in areas of large 
federal employment, and its 
administrative provisions likely 
hold down that share of insurance 
costs. However, utilization and 
price of benefits have the largest 
impact on premiums, and it is not 
clear that FEHBP participation 
helps its health plans to lower 
prices they must pay to 
providers.41 Costs to consumers 
can be held down if they select a 
lower-premium plan with 
relatively low cost sharing, but the 
FEHBP itself does not exercise 
any public purchasing power vis à 
vis medical providers. It simply 
helps enrollees buy private 
insurance and is thus quite 
different from public coverage, 
such as a fee-for-service public 
plan like traditional Medicare or 
the proposed public plan option for 
health reform.42 
Finally, FEHBP-like reform as 
generally discussed is intended to 
be generous, but there may be 
grounds for concern about the 
intersection of benefit levels and 
selection. Existing federal benefits 
have evolved to serve a population 
that is older and has substantially 
higher incomes than the 
uninsured,43 and as already noted, 
participating plans are expensive 
despite the administrative savings 
of FEHBP. Substantial premium 
subsidies might be needed to keep 
them affordable for the uninsured, 
of whom about 80 percent have 
incomes under 300 percent of the 
federal poverty level (the ceiling 
for subsidies in Massachusetts).44 
How affordable an FEHBP level of 
benefits would be depends heavily 
on the mix of new enrollees 
attracted, in terms of their age and 
health status. The uninsured as a 
class are younger than federal 
enrollees but have a higher share 
of people who describe themselves 
as in fair or poor health.45 The 
uncertainty about who will be 
attracted has implications for how 
the exchange relates to 
participating plans. 
The FEHBP as a Model for 
Relationships with 
Participating Health Plans 
The FEHBP’s relationship with 
participating health plans differs 
from traditional state insurance 
regulation. Regulators may, for 
example, require insurance 
companies to include certain 
mandated benefits, to maintain 
minimum ratios of benefit 
payments to premiums, or to 
justify premium increases on some 
types of policies before selling 
them. The FEHBP operates more 
through contracts than through 
legal requirements, and its 
contracting is done more as 
negotiation than as formal bidding. 
OPM’s withholding of some three 
percent of each plan’s premiums as 
a reserve protects plans from cost 
overruns due to actuarial 
underestimation, and can also be 
used to ease the year-to-year 
increase in premiums—thus 
avoiding the rapid price changes 
and churning of membership that 
seem to occur within small group 
markets, for example.46 Even 
greater sharing of risk between 
participating plans and a public 
exchange might be appropriate in 
the early years of its operation, as 
that claims experience will be 
much less predictable than in a 
mature program.47 
It can be argued that FEHBP 
should be more assertive in 
seeking lower prices, as the 
Massachusetts Connector has been, 
and its negotiation with plans 
might be enhanced by obtaining 
better information about plan costs 
or by doing more ex post auditing 
of claims experience. Instead, the 
traditional FEHBP approach relies 
more on enrollee choice to drive 
plans’ benefit designs, provider 
payment levels, and other factors 
that influence premiums. Exactly 
how well FEHBP oversight has 
performed is not clear, but overall 
cost growth appears comparable to 
that of private plans. The FEHBP 
model itself might be modified, 
and it may already constitute an 
improvement upon public 
contracting methods used for 
Medicare Advantage, where there 
is great concern that the public is 
overpaying for benefits obtained.48 
This aspect of FEHBP operations 
merits more attention. 
Finally, it appears that the 
FEHBP’s mechanism of funding 
its central administration through a 
small percentage withhold from 
premiums is effective in 
maintaining steady funding, which 
is not subject to the periodic 
disruptions of legislative 
appropriations. Such independence 
seems good for program 
continuity, although it can also be 
seen as reducing accountability. 
The Massachusetts Connector 
adopted the same administrative 
funding mechanism, but with a 
much higher withholding 
percentage.49 
Conclusion 
The FEHBP’s central mechanism 
of well informed and motivated 
enrollee choice among competing 
health plans—structured or 
managed competition—is a sound 
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and very popular way of providing 
access to health insurance. Various 
existing and proposed reforms 
involve a similar insurance-
purchasing “exchange.”  
For its participants, the FEHBP has 
performed well, maintaining good 
benefits and wide choice of plan 
without fear of rejection or 
differential pricing by health status 
or age. Coverage is also portable. 
For health plans, the FEHBP 
continues to be attractive enough 
to draw active participation from 
many diverse firms. Some HMOs 
have dropped out, evidently 
because of FEHBP’s pricing 
policy, and some formerly large 
open-access fee-for-service plans 
have failed because of adverse 
selection. For politicians, the 
FEHBP model appeals to political 
conservatives with its private 
health plans and competition and 
to liberals with its large-employer 
benefits, community rating, and 
oversight of insurers.50 
FEHBP experience suggests three 
main lessons for new reforms. 
First, selection issues are serious 
and have over time altered 
program operations. It seems very 
likely that stronger 
countermeasures will be needed 
for a new exchange than the 
FEHBP has as yet deployed. 
Second, it is a challenge, but so far 
feasible, to maintain a wide spread 
of benefit packages for enrollees to 
choose among. Plausibly, better 
risk adjustment or other anti-
selection mechanisms would assist 
in this goal. Third, the FEHBP 
model of relating to health plans 
through negotiation and reducing 
the risk that plans take is an 
alternative to conventional public 
contracting or regulation. With 
modifications, it is worth further 
consideration as a model. 
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